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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a logical model of inductive generalization,  and specif- 
ically of the machine learning task of inductive  concept learning (ICL).  We 
argue  that   some inductive  processes,  like ICL,  can  be  seen as  a  form  of 
defeasible reasoning.  We define a consequence relation  characterizing  which 
hypotheses can be induced from given sets of examples, and study its proper- 
ties, showing they correspond to a rather  well-behaved non-monotonic  logic. 
We will also show that  with the addition  of a preference relation  on induc- 
tive theories we can characterize  the inductive  bias of ICL algorithms.  The 
second part  of the paper shows how this logical characterization of inductive 
generalization  can be integrated with another  form of non-monotonic reason- 
ing (argumentation), to define a model of multiagent ICL. This integration 
allows two or more agents to learn, in a consistent way, both from induction 
and  from arguments  used in the  communication  between  them.   We show 
that  the inductive  theories achieved by multiagent induction  plus argumen- 
tation  are sound,  i.e.  they  are precisely the  same as the  inductive  theories 
built by a single agent with all data. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Inductive  generalization  is the basis for machine learning methods which 
learn general hypotheses  from examples.  However, with the exception of a 
few isolated proposals [1, 2, 3, 4], there has been little effort towards specific 
logical models of inductive generalization.  The lack of a formal logical model 
of induction  may have hindered the development of approaches that  combine 
induction  with other forms of logical reasoning. 
In this  paper  we do not  tackle  induction  in its more general definition, 
but  limit ourselves to inductive  generalization,  and specifically, to the com- 
mon task of inductive concept learning (ICL), which is the most well studied 
induction problem in machine learning.  We will argue that  inductive general- 
ization is a form of defeasible reasoning, and define an inductive consequence 
relation (denoted by |∼) characterizing which hypotheses can be induced from 
given sets of examples, and show its logical properties. 
Relationships  between inductive  reasoning and non-monotonic  reasoning 
have already been established  by Flach in [1, 5], where he presents  a logical 
analysis of induction  and considers several postulates  for a general inductive 
consequence relation  along with representation theorems  in terms  of prefer- 
ential  models,  in the  tradition of non-monotonic  reasoning1   [7].  However, 
while the  work of Flach  aims at  defining general rationality postulates  for 
induction  in general, our focus is on characterizing  a particular form of in- 
duction  (ICL),  which allows us to  develop a more concrete  model (see B 
for an in-depth  comparison  of our proposal with Flach’s).  Moreover, Flach 
presents  a logical characterization of induction  focusing on hypothesis gen- 
eration  rather  than  hypothesis selection,  i.e.  intending  to model which are 
the valid hypotheses  one can induce from a set of examples, but  not which 
of those hypotheses  is the best one.  In this paper,  within the framework of 
ICL, we go one step further and propose that  hypothesis selection can also be 
logically characterized  by means of a preference relation on inductive theories 
(suitable  sets of hypotheses),  and  propose some preference relations  which 
capture  the typical biases used in ICL algorithms  (like parsimony or margin 
maximization). 
There are two main implications  of defining a logical model of inductive 
generalization.  First,  it allows for a better  understanding of ICL algorithms, 
and  second, it  facilitates  the  integration of inductive  reasoning  with  other 
 
 
1 A similar work for abductive reasoning  is that of Pino-Pe´rez and Uzc´ategui [6].
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forms of logical reasoning,  as we will show by integrating ICL with  com- 
putational argumentation to define a model of multiagent ICL. This paper 
extends  the preliminary  work in [8], modeling inductive  generalization  as a 
non-monotonic logic, extending the properties satisfied, and using preference 
relations  to model bias in ICL. 
The  second  part   of  this  paper  presents   an  integration  of  two  non- 
monotonic forms of reasoning:  induction  and argumentation.  This integra- 
tion shows the advantage  of having a logical model of induction.  For instance, 
a multiagent induction  system such as [9] already introduced  the idea of in- 
tegrating  inductive  learning and argumentation in an implemented  systems, 
but lacked any formal grounding for such an integration. In particular, in this 
paper we present a model of multiagent ICL obtained by directly integrating 
our inductive  consequence relation  with  computational argumentation.  In 
this approach,  argumentation is used to model the communication  between 
agents, and ICL models their internal  learning processes. 
The remainder  of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces 
the problem of inductive concept learning as typically framed in the machine 
learning literature. Then,  Section 3 introduces  a logical model of induction 
and proposes an inductive  consequence relation,  while Section 4 deals with 
preferences over inductive  theories.   In Section 5 we recall basic notions  of 
computational argumentation and we introduce the notion of argumentation- 
consistent induction.  Next, Sections 6 and 7 define a model of multiagent ICL 
by integrating our logical model of ICL with computational argumentation. 
The paper closes discussing some related work and with the conclusions. We 
have  also included  two  appendices:   Appendix  A contains  a generalization 
of Theorem  1 to  n  agents,  and  Appendix  B provides  more details  on the 
comparison of our inductive consequence relation with Flach’s previous work. 
 
 
2.  Background 
 
Inductive  concept  learning  (ICL)  [10] using inductive  techniques  is not 
defined formally  in the  literature of machine  learning;  rather  it  is usually 
defined as a task, as follows: 
 
Given: 
 
1. A space X of instances 
2. A space of hypotheses  or generalizations  H , modeled as a set of 
mappings h : X → {0, 1}
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3. A target concept  c, modeled  as a partially  known mapping  c : 
X → {0, 1} 
4. A set  D  of training  examples  (for which c is known),  where  a 
training  example is a pair hxi , c(xi )i 
 
Find a hypothesis  h ∈ H  such that  h(x)  = c(x) for each instance  x in the 
set of training  examples D 
 
This strictly  Boolean definition is usually weakened to allow the equality 
h(x)  = c(x) not being true  for all examples in D but  just  for a percentage, 
and the difference is called the error  of the learnt hypothesis. 
Another definition of inductive concept learning is that  used in Inductive 
Logic Programing  (ILP)  [11], where the background  knowledge, in addition 
to the examples, has to be taken into account.  Nevertheless, ILP also defines 
ICL as a task to be achieved by an algorithm,  as follows: 
 
Given: 
1. A set of positive E+ and negative E−   examples of a predicate  p 
2. A set of Horn rules (background  knowledge) B 
3. A space of hypotheses  H (a sublanguage  of Horn logic language) 
 
Find A hypothesis  h ∈ H such that 
 
•  ∀e ∈ E+ : B ∧ h |= e (h is complete) 
•  ∀e ∈ E−  : B ∧ h |= e (h is consistent) 
 
These definitions, although  widespread, are unsatisfactory and leave sev- 
eral  issues without  a  precise characterization.   For  example,  the  space  of 
hypotheses  H  is usually  expressed only by conjunctive  formulas.  However, 
most concepts need more than  one conjunctive  formula (more than  one gen- 
eralization)  but  this  is “left  outside”  of the  definition  and  is explained  as 
part  of the strategy  of an inductive algorithm.  For instance,  the set-covering 
strategy  [12] consists  of finding one definition  that  covers only part  of the 
positive examples in D, proceeding then  to eliminate  the covered examples 
to obtain  a new D0  that  will be used in the next  step.  Another  example is 
that,  typically, smaller  hypotheses  are preferred  to  longer hypotheses;  but 
again, that  is left out of the definition. 
In this paper our goal is not to provide a definition of the task of inductive 
concept  learning,  but  to provide a logical characterization of the  inductive 
inference processes required for performing such task.
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3.  Inductive Generalization for  Concept Learning 
 
Inductive  generalization  can  be seen as having  two main  components: 
hypothesis generation and hypothesis selection [1]. We will model the former 
using an inductive  consequence  relation,  that  defines which statements are 
valid inductive consequences of given a set of examples, and the later using a 
preference relation,  which determines  which of those statements are “better” 
than others.  This section formally defines our inductive consequence relation. 
 
3.1.  An Inductive Consequence Relation 
In order to present our model of inductive  concept learning,  let us start 
by describing our language.  There are three basic elements in our language: 
examples,  hypotheses  (or generalizations)  and  background  knowledge.  We 
will use fragments of first-order logic as the representation language for these 
elements.  Given that  we focus on inductive concept learning, hypotheses will 
basically be classification rules (i.e. rules which classify an example as either 
belonging to the target  concept or not).  Therefore, in the rest of this paper, 
the hypotheses  induced from examples will be called rules. 
We will use a distinguished  unary  predicate  C to denote the target  con- 
cept.  Thus,  we will write C (a) when the example identified by the constant 
a belongs to the target  concept, and ¬C (a) otherwise.  Our formulas will be 
of two kinds:  examples, and rules. 
 
•  Examples  will be  conjunctions  of the  form ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a),  where  a  is 
a  constant, ϕ(x)  is an  arbitrary formula  with  x  being  its  only free 
variable.   A positive example of C will be of the  form ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a);  a 
negative example of C will be of the form ϕ(a) ∧ ¬C (a). 
 
•  Rules will be universally quantified  formulas of the form (∀x)(ϕ(x) → 
C (x)),  where ϕ(x)  is an arbitrary formula  with  x being its only free 
variable. 
 
The set of examples will be noted by Le and the set of rules by Lr , and the 
set of all formulas of our language will be L = Le ∪ Lr . In what follows, we 
will use the symbol ` to denote  derivation  in classical first order logic.  By 
background knowledge we will refer to a finite set of formulas K ⊂ Lr . 
Let us assume that  the  similarity  type  of our first-order  language  is fi- 
nite (that is, we have a finite number  of constants,  predicates  and function
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symbols).  We fix a finite number of variables and we assume that  all the vari- 
ables contained  in the  formulas (either  in examples or in rules) are among 
these.   Without  loss of generality  we can also assume that  in each formula 
(either  in examples or in rules) there are not different quantifier  blocks with 
the same variable.  Moreover, we can assume also that,  the variable  x does 
not  occur quantified  in φ(x).   For instance,  we will not  allow formulas like 
φ(x)  :=  (∀y)Ryx ∧ (∃y)(∀x)T xy.  Under  these assumptions,  using the  fact 
that  every first-order formula is logically equivalent to a prenex formula with 
the same free variables, it is not difficult to check that  there are only a finite 
number  of (example  and rule) formulas modulo logical equivalence (see for 
instance  [13, Chap.  2]). Therefore,  we will assume that  both  Le and Lr  are 
finite. 
The  previously defined notation  allows us to define an inductive  conse- 
quence relation  between  examples  and  rules.   For  simplicity  we will write 
α → β as a shorthand for the formula (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)). 
 
Definition 1.  (Covering) Given background knowledge K , we say that  a 
rule α → C covers an example ϕ(a)∧C (a) (or ϕ(a)∧¬C (a)) when ϕ(a)∧K  ` 
α(a). 
 
Definition 2.  (Inductive Consequence) Given background knowledge K , 
a set of examples ∆ ⊆ Le and a rule r = α → C , the inductive  consequence 
∆ |∼K α → C holds iff: 
1) (Explanation) r covers at least one positive example of C in ∆, 
2) (Consistency) r does not cover any negative example of C in ∆ 
 
Notice that  if we have two conflicting examples in ∆ of the form ϕ(a) ∧ 
C (a) and ψ(b) ∧ ¬C (b), and ϕ(a)  is a less specific description than  ψ(a) (i.e. 
K  ` ψ(a)  → ϕ(a)) then  no rule α → C covering the  example ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a) 
can be inductively derived from ∆.  The next definition identifies when a set 
of examples is free of these kind of conflicts. 
 
Definition 3. (Consistent Set  of Examples) A set of examples ∆ is said 
to be consistent with respect  to a concept C and background  knowledge K 
when: if ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a)  and ψ(b) ∧ ¬C (b)  belong to ∆, then both K  6` ϕ → 
ψ and K 6` ψ → ϕ. 
 
Definition 4. (Inducible Rules) Given a consistent  set of examples ∆ and 
background knowledge K , the set of all rules that can be induced from ∆ and 
K  is IRK (∆)  = {(ϕ → C ) ∈ Lr | ∆ |∼K ϕ → C }.
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Notice that  if ∆ contains examples for a given concept C and also exam- 
ples of ¬C , the set IRK (∆)  will contain both rules that  conclude C and rules 
that  conclude ¬C .  In general,  IRK (∆)  contains  rules that conclude every 
concept  for which there  are  examples  in ∆.   Also, notice  that  since Lr  is 
finite, IRK (∆)  must also be finite. Next we show some interesting  properties 
of the inductive  consequence |∼K . 
Some formalizations of defeasible reasoning as non-monotonic logics, such 
as [14] and [7], consider Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence and Right Weak- 
ening the basic properties  without  which a system should not be considered 
a logical system,  while others,  such as [15], consider Reflexivity and Cut  to 
be the  basic properties  of a logical system.   Since our consequence relation 
is defined between two different sets of formulas (examples and rules), most 
of these properties  do not  directly  apply to our setting.   Nevertheless,  it is 
interesting  to check whether  the principles underlying  these properties  hold 
for our consequence relation. 
Intuitively  speaking, the Left Logical Equivalence property  expresses the 
requirement that  logically equivalent formulas have exactly the same conse- 
quences.  In our framework,  in order to evaluate  this  principle,  we need to 
define first the notion of equivalent sets of examples. 
 
Definition 5.  (Equivalent  Sets of Examples) Given background knowl- 
edge K , and two sets of examples ∆ = ∆+ ∪ ∆− and Γ = Γ+ ∪ Γ−,  where 
 
∆+ = {ϕ0(a0 ) ∧ C (a0 ), . . . , ϕk (ak ) ∧ C (ak )} 
∆− = {ϕk+1 (ak+1 ) ∧ ¬C (ak+1 ), . . . , ϕn (an ) ∧ ¬C (an )} 
Γ+ = {φ0(b0 ) ∧ C (b0 ), . . . , φl (bl ) ∧ C (bl )} 
Γ−  = {φl+1 (bl+1 ) ∧ ¬C (bl+1 ), . . . , φm (bm ) ∧ ¬C (bm )}, 
 
we say that ∆ is equivalent to Γ modulo K , (∆ ≡K   Γ), iff 
1. For  every i ≤ k, there is j ≤ l such that K ` ϕi → φj 
2. For  every j ≤ l, there is i ≤ k such that K ` φi → ϕj 
3. For  every i > k, there is j > l such that K ` ϕi → φj 
4. For  every j > l, there is i > k such that K ` φi → ϕj 
 
Now we can show that,  after suitable  reformulations,  Left Logical Equiv- 
alence and the rest of above mentioned  properties  are satisfied. 
 
Proposition 1.  The inductive consequence relation  |∼K  satisfies the follow- 
ing properties:
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1. Reflexivity:  Assume that  ∆ is consistent  w.r.t.   C  and  K .  If ϕ(a)  ∧ 
C (a) ∈ ∆, then ∆ |∼K ϕ → C . 
2. Left Logical Equivalence:  If ∆ |∼K α → C and ∆ ≡K   ∆0, then ∆0  |∼K 
α → C . 
3. Right Logical Equivalence:  If K  ` β  ↔  α  and  ∆ |∼K  α  →  C ,  then 
∆ |∼K β → C . 
4. Cut:  If ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a), φ(b) ∧ C (b)} |∼K  α → C  and  K  ` ϕ → φ 
then ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K α → C . 
5. Cautious  Monotonicity:  If ∆ |∼K α → C and ∆ |∼K β → C , for every 
new constant  b, ∆ ∪ {α(b) ∧ C (b)} |∼K β → C . 
6. Cautious  Right Weakening:  If K  ` α  → β  and  ∆ |∼K β  → C , and 
α → C covers some positive example in ∆, then ∆ |∼K α → C . 
 
Proof. 
 
1. Since ϕ(a) ∧ C (a) ∈ ∆ and we obviously have ϕ(a) ∧ K ` ϕ(a),  expla- 
nation  trivially  holds.  Now assume ψ(a) ∧ ¬C (a) ∈ ∆.  Then,  since ∆ 
is consistent w.r.t.  C and K , ψ(a) ∧ K 6` ϕ(a),  hence consistency 
also holds. 
2. By definition  of covering, if a rule α  → C  covers a positive example 
of ∆,  say ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a),  it covers any other  example φ(b) ∧ C (b)  ∈ ∆0 
such that  K  ` ϕ  →  φ.  By definition  of equivalent  sets of examples 
(modulo K ), at least one of such examples belongs to ∆0.  An analogous 
argument holds for the negative examples. 
3. By definition  of covering,  two  logically equivalent  rules  (modulo  K ) 
cover exactly the same positive and negative examples. 
4. The  reason  is that,   if the  rule  α  →  C  covers the  positive  example 
φ(b) ∧ C (b),  since K  ` ϕ  → φ, then  α → C also covers the  positive 
example ϕ(a) ∧ C (a). 
5. By Definition 2 adding a positive example for an induced rule maintains 
the validity  of that  rule. 
6. By Definition 2 the rule α → C clearly satisfies the explanation  prop- 
erty.  Moreover, α → C satisfies also the consistency  property:   other- 
wise, since K ` ϕ → φ, the rule β → C will cover a negative example, 
contrary  to our assumption.
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The first property,  Reflexivity, transforms  (or lifts ) every example e ∈ ∆ 
into a rule re where constants  have been substituted by variables.  This lifting 
is usually called in ICL literature the “single representation trick,”  by which 
an  example  in the  language  of instances  (here  Le ) is transformed  into  an 
expression in the language of hypotheses  (here Lr ). 
The  Right Logical Equivalence  property  expresses that  one may replace 
logically equivalent  formulas by one another  on the  right  of the  |∼K .  The 
Cut property  expresses the fact that  one may, in his way towards a plausible 
conclusion, first add a hypothesis to the facts he knows to be true and prove 
the plausibility of his conclusion from this enlarged set of facts and then infer 
inductively  this added hypothesis from the facts.  Notice that  the validity  of 
Cut  does not imply monotonicity.  Nevertheless, we have seen that  a form of 
Cautious  Monotonicity  holds for our relation. 
Observe also that  the inductive consequence relation |∼K does not satisfy 
Right Weakening :  If K  ` α → β and ∆ |∼K β → C , then  ∆ |∼K α → C . 
The reason is that,  since α is more specific than β, the rule α → C may cover 
no positive example.  Right Weakening  expresses the fact that  one must  be 
ready to accept as plausible consequences all that  is logically implied by what 
one thinks are plausible consequences. We have proposed instead a Cautious 
Right Weakening  property  as the one that  is relevant in our model. 
Let us now analyze some additional  properties,  which are specially rele- 
vant for inductive  concept learning. 
 
Proposition 2.  The inductive consequence relation  |∼K  satisfies the follow- 
ing properties: 
1. If ∆ |∼K α → C and K ` α → ϕ then ∆ |∼K ϕ → ¬C . 
2. If ∆ |∼K α → C and K ` ϕ → α then ∆ |∼K ϕ → ¬C . 
3. Falsity  Preserving:   let r = α  →  C  be such that  it covers a negative 
example from ∆, hence r 6∈ IRK (∆); then  r 6∈ IRK (∆ ∪ ∆0)  for  
any further  set of examples ∆0. 
4. Positive  Monotonicity:  ∆ |∼K α → C implies ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K 
α → C . 
5. Negative Monotonicity:  if ϕ(a)  ∧ ¬C (a)  ∈ ∆, ∆ |∼K α → C  implies 
∆ \ {ϕ(a) ∧ ¬C (a)} |∼K α → C . 
6. Positive  Non-monotonicity:  if ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a)  ∈ ∆, ∆ |∼K α → C  does 
not imply ∆ \ {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K α → C . 
7. Negative Non-monotonicity: ∆ |∼K  α → C does not imply ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ 
¬C (a)} |∼K α → C , but it implies ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ ¬C (a)} |∼K α → ¬C .
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8. Generalization:  if ∆ = {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a)}  and  ∆ |∼K α  → C  then  K  ` 
ϕ → α. 
9. If ∆1 ∪ ∆2 |∼K α → C then either  ∆1 |∼K α → C or ∆2 |∼K α → C , 
that is, IRK (∆1 ∪ ∆2 ) ⊆ IRK (∆1 ) ∪ IRK (∆2). 
 
Proof. 
 
1. Let  us assume  that  K  ` α  →  ϕ  and  ∆ |∼K  ϕ  →  ¬C .   Then,  by 
Consistency,  for all ψ(a) ∧ C (a)  ∈ ∆ we have ψ(a) ∧ K  6` ϕ(a),  
and hence ψ(a) ∧ K 6` α(a)  as well. Then,  clearly ∆ |∼K α → C . 
2. Let us assume now that  K  ` ϕ → α and ∆ |∼K ϕ → ¬C .  Then,  by 
Explanation, there exists ψ(a) ∧ ¬C (a) ∈ ∆ such that  ψ(a) ∧ K ` ϕ(a). 
But then  we have ψ(a) ∧ K ` α(a)  as well, so again ∆ |∼K α → C . 
3. Notice that  if r covers a negative example of ∆, that  particular example 
will remain in ∆ ∪ ∆0. 
4. This property  is stronger  than  Cautious  Monotonicity,  and follows by 
the same argument. 
5. It is direct consequence that  if α → C follows from ∆,  it cannot  cover 
any negative example. 
6. Removing a positive example invalidates  an inductive  inference when 
that  example is the only one covered the rule. 
7. ∆ |∼K α → C does not imply ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ ¬C (a)} |∼K α → C because 
nothing  prevents  ϕ(a) ∧ K ` α(a)  to hold.  The fact that  ∆ ∪ {ϕ(a) ∧ 
¬C (a)} |∼K α → ¬C is there a consequence of Properties  3 and 1. 
8. If ∆ consists of only one positive example ϕ(a)  ∧ C (a),  the  only way 
for α to cover ϕ(a)  is that  α (classically) follows from ϕ. 
9. Let r ∈ IRK (∆1 ∪ ∆2) (see Definition 4). It means that  r at least covers 
a positive example  e+  ∈ ∆1 ∪ ∆2  and  covers no negative  example  of 
∆1 ∪ ∆2, so it covers no negative  example of both  ∆1  and ∆2.  Now, 
if e+  ∈ ∆1  then  clearly  r ∈ IRK (∆1); otherwise,  if e+  ∈ ∆2, then 
r ∈ IRK (∆2), hence in any case r ∈ IRK (∆1 ) ∪ IRK (∆2). 
 
 
 
Let us now examine the intuitive interpretation of the properties in Propo- 
sition 2 from the point of view of ICL; for this purpose we will reformulate 
some notions into the vocabulary  commonly used in ICL. 
Properties  1 and 2 state  that  by generalizing (resp.  specializing) an in- 
duced rule will never conclude the negation  of the target  concept.  Property
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3 states the well known fact that  induction  is falsity preserving, i.e. once we 
know some induced rule is not valid, it will never be valid again by adding 
more examples to ∆.   Property 4 states  that  adding  a positive example e+ 
does not invalidate  any existing induced rule, i.e. IRK (∆)  does not decrease; 
notice  that  it  can increase since IRK (∆ ∪ {e+ })  might  have induced  rules 
that  explain e+ that  were not in IRK (∆). Property 5 states  that  no negative 
example  can be covered if α  → C follows from ∆.   Property 6 states  that 
when we remove the only positive example covered by the rule, we invalidate 
the inductive  inference. 
Property 7 states  that  adding  a negative  example  e−   might invalidate 
existing  induced  rules  in IRK (∆), i.e.   IRK (∆ ∪ {e−})  ⊆  IRK (∆).  This 
is related  to Property 3, since once a negative  example defeats  an induced 
rule r, we know r will never be valid regardless of how many examples are 
added to ∆.  Property 8 states a generalization  property,  in the case where ∆ 
consists of only one positive example.  Property 9 states  that  the rules that 
can be induced  from the  union of two  sets of examples are a subset  of the 
union of the rules that  can be induced from each of the sets. 
Actually, a few of the mentioned properties in Propositions  1 and 2 suffice 
to fully characterize  the inductive  consequence relation |∼K , as we will show 
presently.  For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that  we don’t have any 
background  knowledge K . 
 
Proposition 3.  (Characterization) Let   |≈   be a  relation  between con- 
sistent  sets  of examples for a concept  C  and  rules  satisfying  the following 
properties: 
 
(P1)  Reflexivity:  if ϕ(a) ∧ C (a) ∈ ∆ then ∆ |≈ ϕ → C 
 
(P2)  Generalization:  if ∆ = {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a)} and ∆ |≈ α → C then ` ϕ → α 
 
(P3)  Negative Monotonicity:   if ∆ |≈ α → C and ϕ(a)  ∧ ¬C (a)  ∈ ∆, then 
∆ \ {ϕ(a) ∧ ¬C (a)} |≈ α → C 
 
(P4)  If ∆1 ∪ ∆2 |≈ α → C then either ∆1 |≈ α → C or ∆2 |≈ α → C 
 
(P5)  If ∆ |≈ α → C and ` α → ϕ then ∆ |6≈ ϕ → ¬C 
. 
 
Then,  it  holds that  ∆ |≈  α  →  C  iff α  →  C  covers at  least  one  positive 
example of C and does not cover any negative example of C in ∆, as required 
by Definition 2.
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Proof.  In what  follows, given a consistent set of examples ∆ and a concept 
C , we will denote by ∆+ its subset of positive examples for C in ∆,  and by 
∆− its set of negative examples.  Assume ∆ |≈ α → C , we have to prove that 
(i) α → C covers some positive example in ∆ and (ii) α → C does not cover 
any negative example. 
(i)  Using (P3)  one can  remove all negative  examples  from ∆ but  still 
preserving the consequence, i.e. we have ∆+ |≈ α → C . Now, using (P4),  we 
conclude that  there must exist at least one positive example ϕ(a)∧C (a) ∈ ∆+ 
such that  {ϕ(a) ∧ C (a)} |≈ α → C . Finally, by (P2),  one has that  ` ϕ → α. 
(ii) By contraposition. Assume α → C covers a negative example ψ(b) ∧ 
¬C (b)  ∈ ∆−, and  hence ` ψ → α.  By (P1),  we have ∆ |≈ ψ → ¬C , and 
since ` ψ → α, by (P5)  we also have ∆ |6≈ α → C , contradiction. 
 
3.2.  Inductive Theories 
The  notions  of inductive  consequence  and  inducible  rules  allow us  to 
define the idea of an inductive theory for a given concept as a set of inducible 
rules which, together with the background knowledge, explain all the positive 
examples. 
 
Definition 6.  (Inductive Theory) An inductive  theory  T  for a concept 
C , w.r.t.   ∆ and  K , is a subset T  ⊆ IRK (∆)  such that  all the rules  in T 
conclude C , and for all ϕ(a) ∧ C (a) ∈ ∆, it holds that T ∪ K ∪ {ϕ(a)} ` C (a). 
T is minimal if there is no T 0   ⊂ T that T 0    is an inductive theory for C . 
 
Since rules concluding C in IRK (∆)  do not cover any negative example of 
C , if T is an inductive  theory  for C w.r.t.  ∆ and K , and ψ(a) ∧ ¬C (a) ∈ ∆ 
for some constant a, then it holds that  T ∪ K ∪ {ψ(a)} 6` C (a).  Observe 
that,  in the case that  ∆ is a consistent set of examples, the existence of 
inductive theories  is guaranteed due  to  the  reflexivity property:   the  set  of  
all rules obtained  lifting examples is an inductive theory.  Notice also that 
the notion of inductive theory is relevant for ICL because an inductive 
machine learning algorithm  has as output a specific inductive  theory. 
 
3.3.  Exemplification 
The Zoology data  set is a standard machine learning dataset containing 
101 instances of animals associated with an animal family (fish, insect, mam- 
mal, etc.).  The goal is to learn general descriptions of each of the families by 
induction.   For exemplification purposes,  we will use mammal  as our target
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concept, represented  by m.  The Zoology dataset, as available from the UCI 
machine learning repository,  has no background knowledge so K = ∅.  Let us 
now consider three animals in Zoology (an aardvark,  an antelope and a bass): 
 
e1 :=     hair(a1) ∧ milk(a1) ∧ predator(a1) ∧ toothed(a1 ) 
∧ backbone(a1 ) ∧ breathes(a1) ∧ f ourlegged(a1) 
∧ catsize(a1 ) ∧ m(a1) 
= ϕ1(a1) ∧ m(a1) 
e2 :=     hair(a2) ∧ milk(a2) ∧ toothed(a2) ∧ backbone(a2) 
∧ breathes(a2) ∧ f ourlegged(a2 ) ∧ tail(a2) 
∧ catsize(a2 ) ∧ m(a2 ) 
= ϕ2(a2) ∧ m(a2) 
e3 :=     eggs(a3) ∧ aquatic(a3 ) ∧ predator(a3 ) ∧ f ins(a3 ) 
∧ backbone(a3 ) ∧ toothed(a3 ) ∧ tail(a3) ∧ ¬m(a3) 
= ϕ3(a3) ∧ ¬m(a3) 
 
Given  ∆  =  {ϕ1 (a1)  ∧ m(a1), ϕ2(a2)  ∧ m(a2), ϕ3(a3 ) ∧ ¬m(a3)},   to 
illustrate  |∼K , we consider several hypotheses: 
 
r1 :=    (∀x)(hair(x) ∧ milk(x)  → m(x)) 
r2 :=    (∀x)(toothed(x) ∧ backbone(x) → m(x)) 
r3 :=    (∀x)(tail(x) ∧ domestic(x) → m(x)) 
r4 :=    (∀x)(f ourlegged(x) → m(x)) 
 
 
•  ∆ |∼K  r1, because  both  ϕ1(a1)   ` hair(a1) ∧ milk(a1) and  ϕ2 (a2)  ` 
hair(a2) ∧ milk(a2 )  (thus  satisfying  the  explanation   condition)  and 
ϕ3 (a3) 6` hair(a3)∧milk(a3) (thus satisfying the consistency 
condition). 
 
•  ∆ |∼K r2, because ϕ1 (a1) ` toothed(a1 )∧backbone(a1), hence it satisfies 
explanation,  but ϕ3(a3 ) ` toothed(a3) ∧ backbone(a3), and thus it’s not 
consistent. 
 
•  ∆  |∼K   r3, because  ϕ1 (a1)  6` tail(a1 ) ∧ domestic(a1) and  ϕ2 (a2)  
6` tail(a2) ∧ domestic(a2), i.e.  it  does not  satisfy  the  explanation  
con- dition.   So, even if r3  satisfies the  consistency  condition,  it  does  
not explain any example. 
 
•  ∆  |∼K   r4, because  both   ϕ1(a1)    ` f ourlegged(a1 )  and  ϕ2(a2)    ` 
f ourlegged(a2)    (thus    satisfying   the   explanation    condition)    and 
ϕ3 (a3) 6` f ourlegged(a3)  (thus  satisfying the consistency condition).
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In this example, the sets T1 = {r1} ⊆ IRK (∆), T2 = {r4} ⊆ IRK (∆)  and 
T3  = {r1, r4} ⊆ IRK (∆)  are inductive  theories of m w.r.t.  ∆.  Clearly, only 
T3  is not minimal. 
 
 
4.  Preference over Inductive Consequences 
 
Although  many  rules  can  be inductive  consequences  of a  given set  of 
examples, ICL algorithms  have a set of preferences and inductive biases that 
make them prefer some rules over the rest, or some inductive theories over the 
rest.  For example, rules that  cover more positive examples are preferred over 
rules that  cover less examples, shorter  rules are preferred  over longer rules, 
and  hypotheses  with  larger  margins  are  preferred  over those  with  smaller 
margins [16]. In our model of inductive  generalization  we incorporate  these 
criteria  by means of a preference relation. 
Depending on the bias we want to model, the preference relation might be 
defined over rules or over inductive  theories.  In either case, since preference 
might depend on both the set of examples ∆ and background  knowledge K , 
we will note our preference relation  by ≥∆,K . 
When the preference is expressed over rules, we write r1 ≥∆,K  r2 when r1 
is at least as preferred as r2 (r1 >∆,K  r2 when r1 is strictly  preferred to r2). 
In general, this preference relation  is only assumed to be a partial  preorder 
in the set IRK (∆). 
 
Definition 7.  (Preferred Rules) The  set  of preferred  rules  IR≥ (∆)   = 
{r ∈ IRK (∆)  | @r 0  ∈ IRK (∆)  : r 0  >∆,K r} is the subset of inducible rules that 
are maximally preferred. 
 
When  the  preference  is  expressed  over  inductive   theories,   we  write 
T1  ≥∆,K  T2  when T1  is at  least  as preferred  as T2.  Again,  in general,  this 
preference  relation  is assumed  to  be only a partial  preorder  on the  set  of 
possible inductive  theories. 
Given  that  ICL algorithms  ultimately  return  inductive  theories,  if the 
preference is expressed over rules, we are interested  in having a preference 
over inductive  theories, which can be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 8. (Preference over Inductive Theories) Given a preference 
≥∆,K  over rules,  an inductive theory T is preferred  over another  theory T 0, 
denoted T ≥∆,K T 0, if there exist r ∈ T , r0  ∈ T 0    such that r ≥∆,K r0, and for 
each r ∈ T there is no r0  ∈ T 0    such that r0  >∆,K r.
15  
 
 
 
 
 
Having a preference relation ≥∆,K on inductive theories allows us to define 
the following concepts of preferred and ideal inductive  theories. 
 
Definition 9.  (Preferred Inductive Theory) We say that  an inductive 
theory T is (maximally)  preferred  with respect  to ≥∆,K  if there  is no other 
inductive theory T 0   ⊆ IRK (∆)  such that T 0   >∆,K T . 
 
Definition 10.  (Ideal Inductive Theory) We say that an inductive theory 
T is ideal with respect to ≥∆,K  if it is both maximally preferred  w.r.t.  ≥∆,K 
and minimal. 
 
We remark that  in the previous definition the term “ideal theory” neither 
carries  any  implicit  meaning  of being  a  “best”  theory  according  to  some 
unspecified criterion  nor any other  mathematical or algebraic meaning, it is 
just a shorthand to denote an inductive theory that  is minimal and maximally 
preferred (according to a given preference relation). 
Next,  we present two examples of how some typical biases of ICL tech- 
niques can be expressed using our framework. 
 
4.1.  Parsimony 
Most ICL algorithms  have a bias towards finding shorter hypotheses (i.e. 
Parsimony  or Occam’s Razor),  which typically translates to  more general 
hypotheses.  We can formalize both notions using two preference relations. 
Given a function size(T ), which returns  the number of symbols required 
to express the inductive  theory  T in a given logical language, we can define 
the preference T1 ≥∆,K T2 ⇔ size(T1) ≤ size(T2 ), which effectively captures 
the bias towards  shorter  hypotheses. 
A bias towards more general hypotheses is easier to express as a preference 
relation  between rules.  We can define the preference relation  α → C ≥∆,K 
β → C iff β ∧ K ` α, i.e. the rule α → C is preferred to β → C if it is more 
general.  Then,  using Definition 8, a preference over inductive  theories  can 
be established,  as well as preferred  (Definition  9) and  ideal (Definition  10) 
inductive  theories. 
 
4.2.  Margin Maximization 
In machine  learning,  margin  is commonly defined as the  distance  from 
the examples to the decision boundary  [16]. A classifier which maximizes the 
margin has the decision boundary  far away from every example; this ensures 
that  small variations  in the  training  set do not  result  in misclassifications.
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Margin maximization  is usually  employed in machine  learning  and  pattern 
recognition techniques where instances are represented  in metric spaces. We 
will show now that  an  analogous  principle  can  be applied  for logic-based 
instance  representation. 
First, in order to use the notion of margin, we need to define some measure 
of distance,  or similarity,  between  examples.   To formalize this  notion,  we 
assume for simplicity that  all predicates  in the language are unary  and that 
examples ϕ(a) ∧ C (a) are such that  ϕ(a)  is a conjunction of literals, i.e. ϕ(a) 
is of the form p1(a) ∧ . . . ∧ pk (a) ∧ ¬pk+1 (a) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬pn (a).  In that  case, the 
only variable  in a predicate  stands  for an example identifier,  and hence for 
our purposes here we can actually  consider these unary predicates  as atomic 
propositions.  Simplifying, we will denote by ϕ the propositionalized  version 
of ϕ(a),  i.e.  ϕ = p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pk ∧ ¬pk+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬pn .  This is indeed the case 
in the example described in Section 5.  We will further  assume the set P  of 
unary  predicates  (now propositional  variables)  we work with is finite. 
Let Ω = {w : P → {0, 1}} be the space of possible worlds. Given a propo- 
sitional formula ϕ, we will denote by [ϕ] the set of possible worlds satisfying 
the formula ϕ (according to classical propositional  logic).  We assume there 
is a distance  function δ : Ω × Ω → R+ . The intuition  is that  δ(w, w0) evalu- 
ates how far or different two worlds w and w0  are:  δ(w, w 0) = 0 means that 
w = w 0, 0 < δ(w, w 0) < 1 means that  w resembles to w0  to some degree.  A 
usual choice for δ, among others (see e.g. [17, 18]), is the Hamming distance, 
that  counts the number  of elements of P over which two worlds differ. 
Given  such  a distance  function  δ on the  set  of possible worlds Ω, the 
distance  between two propositional  formulas built  form P  can be measured 
by  the  distance  between  the  corresponding  sets  of possible worlds,  using 
the  well-known Hausdorff distance  derived  from δ:  δH (ϕ, ψ) = max(Iδ (ϕ  | 
ψ), Iδ (ψ | ϕ)),  where 
Iδ (ϕ | ψ) = max min δ(w, w 0)
w∈[ψ] w0 ∈[ϕ] 
 
Now, given a set of examples ∆,  a distance  δ and a threshold  τ ∈ R+ , we 
can consider an expanded set of examples ∆∗  where for each ϕ(a) ∧ C (a) ∈ ∆ 
(resp.  ϕ(b) ∧ ¬C (b) ∈ ∆) we include all those additional  fictitious examples 
ψ(a0) ∧ C (a0) (resp.  ψ(b0) ∧ ¬C (b0)), such that  the distance  between ψ and ϕ 
is at most τ , i.e. such that  δH (ϕ, ψ) ≤ τ . 
Given an inductive theory T ⊆ IRK (∆), we say that  T is valid to the level 
τ whenever T is also an inductive  theory  of IRK (∆∗ ) (hence, in particular,
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Figure  1: Margin  based on similarity  measure  δH . 
 
 
∆τ  must  be consistent).    We assign a preference  degree  τ  to  an  inductive 
theory  T , noted  Pref (T ) = τ , when τ  is the  maximum  for which T is still 
an  inductive  theory  of IRK (∆∗ ) (i.e.   Pref (T ) is the  maximum  degree to 
which T is valid).  This induces a natural preference over inductive  theories: 
T  ≥∆,K  T 0     ⇔  Pref (T ) ≥ Pref (T 0).   Moreover,  according  to Definition  9, 
a preferred  inductive  theory  T is one such that  there  is no other  inductive 
theory  T 0   ⊆ IRK (∆)  such that  T 0   >∆,K T . 
Notice that,  in the present setting,  a preferred  inductive  theory  T max- 
imizes the  margin  according  to  the  distance  δH .   As shown in Fig.1,  the
reason is that  ∆∗ is expanding  as much as possible around  all positive ex-
amples ϕ(a) ∧ C (a) and negative examples ϕ(b) ∧ ¬C (b) without  T covering 
any fictitious example of the opposite sign. 
 
4.3.  Exemplification 
Let us now illustrate  the use of preferences by continuing  the exemplifi- 
cation started in Section 3.3. 
Let     us    consider     again     the     inductive     theories     used    before: 
T1  = {r1} ⊆ IRK (∆), T2  = {r4} ⊆ IRK (∆)  and  T3  = {r1 , r4 } ⊆ IRK (∆), 
and consider a new inductive  theory  T4 = {r1 , r5 , r6}, where: 
 
r5 :=    (∀x)(hair(x) ∧ f ourlegged(x) → m(x)) 
r6 :=    (∀x)(milk(x) ∧ f ourlegged(x) → m(x)) 
 
Given a function size(·), counting the symbols in a formula (ignoring paren- 
thesis),  the  size of an  inductive  theory  is simply  the  sum  of the  sizes of 
its  rules.    Thus  we have:   size(r1) =  10,  size(r4) =  7,  size(r5) =  10, 
size(r6 ) = 10, and therefore:  size(T1) = 10, size(T2) = 7, size(T3 ) = 17, and
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size(T4)  = 30.  Using the parsimony  preference we have:  T2  ≥∆,K  T1  ≥∆,K 
T3 ≥∆,K T4. In fact, there is no other inductive theory with size smaller than 
7, and thus T2  is a preferred inductive  theory.  Since T2  is also minimal, it is 
actually  an ideal inductive  theory. 
Notice, however, that  if we were to use margin maximization  as the pref- 
erence criterion,  with  the  Hamming  distance,  T2  would  not  be preferred, 
since it is only valid to the  level 0.  In fact,  the  margin  preference degrees 
of these  inductive  theories  are Pref (T1 ) = 0, Pref (T2) = 0, Pref (T3) = 0, 
Pref (T4) = 1 and, thus,  T4  would be preferred to the others. 
 
 
5.  Induction and Argumentation 
 
One  of the  main  advantages  of having  a logical model of induction  is 
that  it  allows an  easy integration of inductive  reasoning  with  other  forms 
of logical reasoning.  In order to illustrate  its benefits, this  section presents 
a model of multiagent ICL obtained  by directly  integrating our  inductive 
consequence relation with computational argumentation. In this integration, 
argumentation is used to model the communication  between agents, and ICL 
models their internal  learning processes. 
For the sake of simplicity of presentation, we will consider a multiagent 
system  scenario  with  two  agents  Ag1  and  Ag2  having  a same  target  con- 
cept C .  However, as shown in A, our main theoretical  result  applies to the 
more general case of an arbitrary number  of agents.  We make the following 
assumptions: 
 
1. The background  knowledge K of both agents is the same2, 
2. The  set of rules Lr and  the  set of examples Le are defined as before 
(see Section 3). 
3. Each  agent  has a set of examples ∆1, ∆2  ⊆ Le such that  ∆1 ∪ ∆2  is 
consistent. 
 
The goal of each agent Agi  is to induce an inductive  theory  Ti  such that 
Ti  ⊆ IR(∆1 ∪ ∆2) and that  constitutes  an inductive  theory  w.r.t.  ∆1 ∪ ∆2. 
We will call this problem multiagent  ICL. 
 
 
2 For simplicity,  since both agents share K and C , in the rest of this paper we will write 
IR(∆) rather than  IRK (∆),  and  just  say  inductive  theory,  instead  of saying  inductive 
theory of C .
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For this purpose, a na¨ıve approach  would be to have both agents sharing 
their  complete sets of examples; however, that  might not be always feasible 
for a number of reasons, like cost or privacy.  In this section, we will show that 
by sharing some of the rules they have induced from examples (rather  than 
all of their examples), two agents can also solve the multiagent ICL problem. 
Let us start  presenting  our computational argumentation framework. 
 
5.1.  Computational  Argumentation 
We will follow Dung’s abstract argumentation formalization  [19] and de- 
fine an argumentation framework as a pair A = (Γ,    ), where Γ is a finite 
set of arguments,  and      is an attack  relation. 
Given two arguments,  r and r0, we write r     r0  to represent that  r attacks 
r0.  Moreover, if both r     r0  and r0    r we say that  r blocks r0. 
As in any argumentation system, the goal is to determine whether a given 
argument is defeated or not according to a given semantics.  In our case we 
will adopt  the semantics based on dialectical trees [20, 21] explained below: 
 
Definition 11.  (Argumentation  Line) Given an  argumentation frame- 
work A = (Γ,    ) and r0 ∈ Γ, an argumentation line in A rooted in r0  is a 
sequence:  λ = hr0, r1, r2, . . . , rk i such that: 
 
1. ri+1    ri (for i ≤ k), 
2. if ri+1    ri and ri blocks ri−1 then ri    ri+1 . 
The argument  rk  is called the leaf node of λ. 
Additionally,  for the  purposes  of ICL,  we will assume  that  the  attack 
relation  has no cycles (which is the case for the definition of attack  we will 
introduce  later in this paper, Definition 12), and hence there are no repeated 
arguments  in an argumentation line. Consequently,  argumentation lines are 
always finite by construction. The set Λ(r0) of maximal argumentation lines 
rooted in r0 are those that  are not subsequences of other argumentation lines 
rooted in r0. Clearly, Λ(r0) can be arranged  in the form of a tree, where all 
paths  from the root to the leaf nodes exactly correspond  to all the possible 
maximal  argumentation lines rooted  in r0  that  can  be constructed in the 
given argumentation framework.  In order to decide whether r0 is defeated in 
A, the nodes of this tree are marked U (undefeated) or D (defeated) according 
to the following (cautious)  rules: 
 
1. Every leaf node is marked U,
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2. Each inner node is marked U iff all of its children are marked  D, oth- 
erwise it is marked D. 
 
Therefore,  the arguments  in the argumentation framework A will be ei- 
ther undefeated  or defeated according to their marking,  as follows: 
 
Undefeated: U(A) = {r ∈ Γ | r is marked U in the tree Λ(r)} 
 
Defeated: D(A) = {r ∈ Γ | r is marked D in the tree Λ(r)}. 
 
5.2.  Argumentation-based Induction 
Induction  and  argumentation can  be integrated through  the  notion  of 
argumentation-consistent induction.   While  induction  was defined with  re- 
spect to a set of observations  ∆,  argumentation-consistent induction  will be 
defined with respect  to a set of observations  ∆,  and a set of arguments  Θ. 
The essential idea is that  we consider arguments  to be rules, i.e. Θ ⊆ Lr  (an 
example  can also be used as an argument  through  its corresponding  lifted 
rule, see the reflexivity property  in Proposition  1).  Therefore,  in the rest of 
this paper, we will use the terms “rule” and “argument” interchangeably. 
Given that  arguments  will be rules, we can now define the attack  relation 
  between rules as follows. 
 
Definition 12.  (Attack) Given two rules r, r0  ∈ Γ, an attack relation r     r0 
holds whenever: 
 
1. r = (∀x)(α(x) → `(x)), 
2. r0  = (∀x)(β(x) → ¬`(x)),  and 
3. K ` (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)). 
 
where ¬` = ¬C when ` = C and ¬` = C when ` = ¬C . 
 
Argumentation-consistent induction  consists of inducing rules that  agree 
with both  ∆ (i.e.  not covering negative examples present in ∆) and Θ (i.e. 
not being defeated by the arguments  in Θ). 
 
Definition 13.  (Argumentation-consistent Inducible Rule) 
A rule  r ∈ IR(∆) is argumentation-consistent with respect  to a  set  of 
arguments  Θ if r ∈ U(A), where A = (Θ ∪ IR(∆),    ). 
The set of all the argumentation-consistent rules induced is AIR(∆, Θ) = 
IR(∆) ∩ U(A).
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Now we can define argumentation-consistent inductive  theories. 
 
Definition  14.  (Argumentation-consistent  Inductive  Theory) An 
argumentation-consistent  inductive  theory  T ,  with respect  to  ∆ and  a  set 
of arguments  Θ, is an inductive theory of ∆ such that T ⊆ AIR(∆, Θ). 
 
In the multiagent context starting  in the next section, the goal of an agent 
is to build an argumentation-consistent inductive  theory,  where such theory 
will be composed by rules that  have not been defeated by a set of arguments 
Θ coming from another  agent. 
 
 
6.  Argumentation-consistent Induction in  Multiagent Systems 
 
Let us now show how the  notion  of argumentation-consistent induction 
can be used to model induction  in a scenario with two agents.  The main idea 
is that  agents induce rules from the examples they know, and then they share 
them  with the other  agent.   Rules received from the  other  agent are added 
into the own agent’s argumentation framework to update  her argumentation- 
consistent induced rules.  Thus,  in addition  to the set of examples ∆i , each 
agent Agi  has an individual argumentation framework Ai , containing both (1) 
the set of inducible rules IR(∆) inducted by Agi  and (2) the set of arguments 
Θ received from another  agent. 
Let us now prove that  two agents communicating  their induced rules and 
performing  argumentation using the  kind  of attack  in Definition 12 would 
obtain  the  exact  same set of inducible  rules as a single agent knowing the 
examples known to both agents. 
Since the attack  relation between rules is always the same, in the following 
we will simply write U(Γ)  instead  of U(A) to denote the set of undefeated 
rules of the argumentation system A = (Γ,    ). 
 
Theorem 1.  (Argumentation-consistent Induction) 
U(IR(∆1 ) ∪ IR(∆2)) = IR(∆1 ∪ ∆2). 
 
Proof.  Notice that  by definition U(IR(∆)) = IR(∆); consequently,  we have 
AIR(∆, IR(∆)) = IR(∆). 
First,   we prove  that   IR(∆1  ∪ ∆2 )  ⊆  U(IR(∆1 ) ∪ IR(∆2 )).    Let  r ∈ 
IR(∆1 ∪ ∆2) then r = α → C covers a positive example of ∆1 ∪ ∆2 and does 
not  cover any  negative  example  of ∆1 ∪ ∆2.  W.l.o.g.,  assume  the  covered 
positive example is from ∆1. Then  r ∈ IR(∆1). Suppose there  exists a rule
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Figure  2:  Achieving  multiagent induction by combining  inductive  reasoning  and  compu- 
tational argumentation. 
 
 
r0  = β → ¬C ∈ IR(∆1 ) ∪IR(∆2) such that  r0    r, i.e. such that  K ` β → α. 
It is clear that  r0  6∈ IR(∆1), hence assume that  r0  ∈ IR(∆2). This means 
r0 covers a negative  example δ−  ∈ ∆2, but  if r0  covers it,  r must  cover δ−  
as well, contradiction. 
Second, we prove that  IR(∆1 ∪ ∆2) ⊇ U(IR(∆1) ∪ IR(∆2 )).   Let  r ∈ 
U(IR(∆1 ) ∪ IR(∆2)). W.l.o.g., assume r ∈ IR(∆1). Then r = α → C covers 
a positive example  of ∆1  and  does not cover any  negative  example  of ∆1. 
Assume also, looking for a contradiction, that  r 6∈ IR(∆1 ∪∆2 ). Since we 
have assumed that  r ∈ IR(∆1), this means that  r covers a negative example 
of ∆2. This negative example can be specialized to a rule r0  = β → ¬C ∈ 
IR(∆2 ) such that  K  ` β  → α.   Since r0  is the  specialization  of an  
example  in ∆2 and  ∆1 ∪ ∆2  is consistent,  the  rule  r0   is undefeated.   
Consequently,   r 6∈ U(IR(∆1 ) ∪ IR(∆2)), which contradicts our original 
assumption.   Therefore we can conclude IR(∆1 ∪ ∆2) ⊇ U(IR(∆1) ∪ IR(∆2 
)). 
 
The previous theorem  shows that,  given two agents,  Ag1  and Ag2 , each 
one with sets of examples ∆1 and ∆2 respectively, they can induce the same 
set  of rules either  by sharing  their  induced  rules IR(∆1 ) and  IR(∆2) and 
then  using argumentation, or by exchanging all of their  examples and then 
using induction.   This equivalence is illustrated in Figure 2, that  shows two 
equivalent approaches to obtain an inductive theory w.r.t ∆1 ∪∆2: centralized 
induction (on the left hand side), and argumentation-consistent induction (on 
the right hand  side).  In A of this paper,  we show how this result  applies to 
the more general case of an arbitrary number of agents. 
Clearly, sharing the complete IR(∆i )’s is not a practical  solution either,
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since a) they can be very large, and b) given the reflexivity property,  IR(∆i ) 
contains  ∆i . Nevertheless, Theorem 1 shows that  theoretically,  the problem 
of multiagent ICL can be modeled using individual induction  plus argumen- 
tation.  In fact, if the purpose is finding inductive theories, not all arguments 
in the  IR(∆i )’s need to be exchanged.   Section 7 presents  a dialogue game 
that  finds an inductive theory w.r.t.  ∆1 ∪ ∆2 using the same theoretical  idea 
as used in Theorem  1, but  focusing on exchanging a smaller subset of rules. 
However, let us first illustrate  the  concepts of argumentation-consistent 
induction  described in this section with an exemplification. 
 
6.1.  Exemplification 
Consider   two   agents,    Ag1    and   Ag2 ,   knowing   a   set   of  examples 
∆1  = {e1 , e2 , e4}  and  ∆2  = {e5, e6, e7}.   Here, e1, e2  and  e3  are the  three 
examples used in Section 3.3, and the new four examples (e4  is a sealion, e5 
is a seasnake, e6  is a platypus,  and e7  is a chicken) are defined as: 
 
e4 :=     hair(a4) ∧ milk(a4) ∧ aquatic(a4 ) ∧ predator(a4) ∧ toothed(a4) 
∧ backbone(a4 ) ∧ breathes(a4) ∧ f ins(a4 ) ∧ twolegged(a1 ) 
∧ tail(a4) ∧ catsize(a4) ∧ m(a4) 
= ϕ4(a4) ∧ m(a4) 
e5 :=     aquatic(a5) ∧ predator(a5) ∧ toothed(a5 ) ∧ backbone(a5 ) 
∧ venomous(a5) ∧ f ins(a5 ) 
∧ tail(a5) ∧ ¬m(a5) 
= ϕ5(a5) ∧ ¬m(a5) 
e6 :=     hair(a6) ∧ eggs(a6) ∧ milk(a6) ∧ aquatic(a6) ∧ predator(a6) 
∧ backbone(a6) ∧ breathes(a6 ) ∧ f ourlegged(a6) ∧ tail(a6) 
∧ catsize(a6 ) ∧ m(a6 ) 
= ϕ6 (a6) ∧ m(a6) 
e7 :=     f eathers(a7) ∧ eggs(a7) ∧ airborne(a7 ) ∧ backbone(a7 )∧ 
breathes(a7 ) ∧ twolegged(a7) ∧ tail(a7) ∧ ¬m(a7) 
= ϕ7 (a7) ∧ ¬m(a7 ) 
 
Thus, ∆1 contains three positive examples (e1, e2 and e4) and no negative 
example, and ∆2 contains two negative examples (e5  and e7 ) and one positive 
example  (e6).   Let  us now consider  some of the  rules that  the  agents  can 
induce  from those  examples.   For  instance,  two of the  rules that  Ag1  can 
induce are r1, r3 ∈ IR(∆1) below:
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Figure 3: Two agents,  Ag1  and Ag2 , knowing different sets of examples,  and some sample 
rules that can be induced  from them. 
 
r1 :=    (∀x)(backbone(x) → m(x)) 
r3 :=    (∀x)(backbone(x) ∧ toothed(x)  ∧ twolegged(x) → m(x)) 
 
Agent Ag2  can induce the rule r2 ∈ IR(∆2): 
r2 :=    (∀x)(backbone(x) ∧ toothed(x)  → ¬m(x)) 
 
When  the  two  agents  perform  induction  in isolation,  no issues are  found 
with those three  rules, as shown in Figure 3.  However, let us consider now 
the  situation   where  agent Ag1  communicates  r1  and  r3  to  Ag2,  and  Ag2 
communicates  r2  to Ag1.  In this  situation,  according  to Definition 12, the 
following attacks  hold: r2     r1 and r3     r2 . 
Let us first consider Ag1, who, in addition  to its inducible rules IR(∆1), 
now  has  access  to  the  set  of  rules  Θ2→1      =  {r2 }.     Now,  to  perform 
argumentation-consistent  induction,  Ag1  assesses which are  the  rules  that 
are  both  inducible  from ∆1  and  consistent with  Θ2→1.   For  that  purpose, 
Ag1 constructs  the argumentation framework A1  = (IR(∆1 ) ∪ {r2}, ). It is 
easy to verify that,  since r2 is attacked by r3 , and r3 is not attacked by any 
other rule, r2 is defeated.  Thus, both r1 and r3 are argumentation-consistent 
inductions  and  belong to AIR(∆1, Θ2→1).   Therefore,  knowing r2  does not 
change the set of inducible rules of Ag1, even if r2 attacks  r1 (see Figure 4). 
Now, considering agent Ag2, in addition to its inducible rules IR(∆2), now 
Ag2  has access to the  set of rules Θ1→2   = {r1, r3}.   Similarly as before, to 
perform argumentation-consistent induction,  Ag2 assesses which are the rules 
that  are both  inducible from ∆2  and consistent with Θ1→2 .  Ag2  constructs 
the argumentation framework A2  = (IR(∆2 ) ∪ {r1, r3 }, ). In this case, the 
rule r2, induced  by Ag2  is defeated  (because  it is attacked by r3 , which is
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Figure  4: The same two agents  from Figure  3, after  they  communicate some rules. 
 
 
not attacked by any other rule), and thus r2 6∈ AIR(∆2, Θ1→2 ). Thus, in 
this case, knowing r1 and r3 changes the the set of inducible rules of Ag2 . 
 
 
7.  Reaching Inductive Theories in  Multiagent Concept Learning 
 
While Theorem 1 shows that  it is possible to solve the problem of multi- 
agent ICL using individual induction  plus argumentation, this section shows 
that  when agents want to just  agree on a single inductive  theory,  it is not 
necessary,  in general,  to  exchange  all of their  induced  rules.   This  section 
presents  a dialogue game [22] through  which two agents  can solve the mul- 
tiagent ICL problem by communication,  specifically by exchanging some of 
the rules they induced from examples.  To define the dialogue game, we need 
to define an interaction protocol, including the types of messages that  agents 
are allowed to use, and  the  conditions  under  which types  of messages can 
be exchanged.   The  dialogue game is defined for two  agents  Ag1  and  Ag2, 
each of which has an individual  set of examples ∆1, ∆2, and  consists of a 
series of rounds.  At each round t of the dialogue game, each agent Agi  holds 
a current inductive  theory,  T t , that  is revised after  each round.   When  the 
game terminates, both agents reach a common inductive theory with respect 
to ∆1 ∪ ∆2 . 
During  the  dialogue game, agents  communicate  to  each other  rules in- 
duced from their  examples.  Through  this rule exchange, an agent Agi  may 
attack  the inductive  theory  T t of the other  agent Agj   if it is not consistent 
with ∆i .
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At the end of each round  t, an agent Agi  knows the following six pieces
of information,  namely (∆i , T t , T t , Θt , Θt , At ), where:i     j     i→j j→i     i
 
1. ∆i is the set of examples known to Agi . 
2. T t is the current inductive  theory  w.r.t ∆i that  agent Agi  is holding.
3. T t is the  current inductive  theory  w.r.t  ∆j  that   the  other  agent  is
holding.
4. Θt → is the set of arguments  (rules) that  agent Agi  has sent to Agj  up
to the round t. Notice that Θt → ⊆ I R(∆i ).
5. Θt → is the set of arguments  (rules)  that  agent Agi  has received from
Agj  up to the round t.
6. At = (I R(∆i ) ∪ Θt ,    )  is the  argumentation framework  for Agi ;
notice that  the set of arguments  is composed of the rules inducible by 
Agi  plus the arguments  sent by the other agent Agj . 
 
Let us now provide some auxiliary  definitions, before we introduce  the dia- 
logue game interaction protocol. 
 
Definition 15.  (Defeaters of a rule) 
Given an  argumentation framework A  = (Γ,    ),  and  a defeated argument 
r ∈ D(A), the set of defeaters  of r is: 
 
Defeaters (r, A) = {r 0  ∈ Γ | r0    r and r0  ∈ U(A)} 
 
That  is to say, the set of undefeated  arguments  that  attack  r. 
 
Definition 16.  (Defeated Arguments From Communication)
Given the set of arguments Θt → communicated by Agj  to Agi , the set of those
received arguments that are defeated according to Agi  is Dt = D(At )∩Θt      .j→i i        j→i
 
Using the  previous  definitions,  we can  now present  the  dialogue  game 
through  which two  agents  Ag1  and Ag2  can find an inductive  theory  w.r.t. 
∆1 ∪ ∆2. 
Before the  first  round,  at  t = 0, the  two  agents  are  assumed  to  hold 
initial inductive  theories T 0  ⊆ I R(∆1 ) and T 0  ⊆ I R(∆2) w.r.t.  ∆1 and ∆2 1                                              2 
respectively.   Moreover,  we assume  each agent  has  communicated  its  own 
inductive  theory  to the other agent,  and thus: 
 
Θ0                   0                  0                  0
 
1→2  = T1  and Θ2→1   = T2 ,
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Consequently,  the initial argumentation systems of the agents are set to: 
 
0                                         0                                   0                                         0
 
A1  = (I R(∆1) ∪ Θ2→1,     ) and A2  = (I R(∆2) ∪ Θ1→2 ,    ). 
 
Then,  at each round t, starting  at t = 1, each agent Agi  computes  the new
values of the tuple (T t , Θt , At ), based on the values at the previous round 
(T t−1
  
t−1
  
t−1
 i      i→j      i 
t              t
i     , Θi→j , Ai    ).   Notice that  ∆i  does not  change  and  Tj    and  Θj→i   are 
computed  by the other agent. 
Actually,  each round t ≥ 1 of the protocol is divided in five simple steps: 
generate  attacks,  send attacks,  update  inductive  theories,  send updated  in- 
ductive theories, and update state.  The process ends when no agent generates 
new attacks.  In more detail,  a round t of the protocol is as follows: 
 
1. Generate Attacks:  Agi  generates  a set of attacks  Rt by selecting a
single argument (whichever)  r0  ∈ Defeaters (r, At−1) for each r ∈ Dt−1
i.e. Agi  selects one attack  for each argument r sent by the other agent 
that  is defeated according to Agi . 
2. Send Attacks:  Each agent Agi  sends Rt to the other agent.
If Rt = Rt = ∅,  then  the  process terminates, since this  means  that
the current theories held by each agent (T t−1 and T t−1) are acceptable i              j 
for the other  agent (no attack  can be found).  Otherwise  the protocol 
proceeds to the next step. 
 
3. Update  Inductive  Theories:    Each  agent  Agi    generates  a  new
argumentation-consistent  inductive  theory  T t ⊆ AI R(∆i , Θt−1 ∪ Rj )
such that  (T t−1 ∩U(B t−1)) ⊆ T t , where Bt−1 = (I R(∆i )∪Θt−1 ∪Rt ,    )i                 i                i                   i j→i       j
—i.e.  the  new theory  T t contains  all the  undefeated  rules from T t−1
taking  into  account  the  attacks  received, and  replaces the  rules that 
were defeated in T t−1 by new rules. 
4. Send Updated Inductive Theories:   Each  agent  Agi   sends T 
t  to 
the other agent. 
5. Update State:   the  set  of arguments  received by  each  agent  is in- 
creased accordingly:
•  Θt = Θt−1 t        t 
∪ R ∪
1→2 1→2            1          1
•  Θt = Θt−1 t        t 
∪ R ∪
2→1 2→1            2          2
both agents update  their argumentation frameworks: 
t                              t
 
•  A1  = (I R(∆1) ∪ Θ2→1 ,    )
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•  A2  = (I R(∆2) ∪ Θ1→2,     ) 
And new round t + 1 starts  by going back to the first step. 
 
When  the  process  terminates,  both  agents  have  a  common  and  agreed 
argumentation-consistent inductive  theory,  namely T ∗ = T t ∪ T t . 1          2 
The  reason is that,  when the  process terminates, if the  set ∆1 ∪ ∆2  is 
consistent,  then  each agent Agi  has an argumentation-consistent inductive 
theory  T t w.r.t.  ∆i that  is also consistent with the examples in ∆j .  Never- 
theless, T t might not be an inductive  theory w.r.t.  ∆j , since there might be 
examples in ∆j not covered by T t . However, their  union T ∗ = T t ∪ T t is an i                                                             1          2 
inductive theory w.r.t.  the examples in ∆1 ∪ ∆2 and, since both agents know 
T t            t                                             ∗1  and T2 , both agents can have T as a common and agreed argumentation-
consistent inductive  theory  w.r.t.  ∆1 ∪ ∆2, as the following theorem proves. 
 
Theorem 2.  If the set ∆1 ∪ ∆2  is consistent,  the previous process  always 
ends in a finite number of rounds t, and when it ends, T t ∪ T t is an inductive 1         2 
theory w.r.t.  ∆1 ∪ ∆2. 
Proof.  First,  let us prove that  the  final theories  (T t and T t ) are consistent
with ∆1 ∪ ∆2. For this purpose we will show that  the termination condition
t 
1→2 
t−1 
1→2 and Θ
t → = Θ
t−1 ) implies that  the argumentation-consistent →
inductive theory T t found by agent Agi  at the final round t has no counterex- 
amples in either ∆1 nor in ∆2. 
Let us assume that  there is an example ak  ∈ ∆1 which is a counterexample 
of a rule r ∈ T t .  Because of the  reflexivity property,  there  is a rule rk  ∈ 
IR(∆1) which corresponds  to  that  example.   Since ∆1 ∪ ∆2  is consistent, 
there  is no counterexample  of rk , and thus  rk  is undefeated.   Since rk    r 
by assumption,  r would have been defeated,  and therefore  rule r could not 
be part  of any argumentation-consistent inductive  theory  generated  by Ag2. 
The  same reasoning  can prove that  there  are no counterexamples  of T t  in 
∆1 ∪ ∆2. 
Since T t and T2  are inductive  theories  w.r.t.  ∆1  and ∆2  respectively,  it
follows from the  above that  T t ∪ T t is an inductive  theory  w.r.t.   ∆1 ∪ ∆21           2 
because it has no counterexamples  in ∆1 ∪ ∆2, and every example in ∆1 ∪ ∆2 
is explained at least by one rule in T t or in T t . 1                   2 
Finally,  the  process has to terminate in a finite number  of steps,  since,
by assumption,  IR(∆1) and  IR(∆2 ) are finite sets,  and  the  sets Θt and
2→1   grow at  least  with  one new argument  at  each round;  however, since
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i→j ⊆ IR(∆i ), there is only a finite number  of new arguments  that  can be
added to Θt → before the termination condition holds.
 
Thus,    we   have   shown   that    the   inductive    theories   achieved   by 
argumentation-consistent  induction  are sound.   Theorem  1 has shown that 
the set of inductive  theories that  can be reached  through  sharing  examples 
is the same as the set of inductive  theories  that  can be reached  by sharing 
induced rules and then performing argumentation-consistent induction.  Fur- 
thermore,  Theorem 2 shows that  it is possible to reach one of those inductive 
theories by using a simple dialogue game that  does not require in general the 
exchange of all the induced rules made by an agent.  As a consequence, cen- 
tralizing all examples into a single inductive process is no longer imperative, 
at least in ICL, since induction  followed by argumentation is a viable option. 
The process to find a multiagent inductive theory can be seen as composed 
of three  mechanisms:  induction,  argumentation and belief revision.  Agents 
use induction  to  generate  general  rules  from concrete  examples,  they  use 
argumentation to  decide which of the  rules  sent  by another  agent  cannot 
be defeated,  and finally they perform belief revision when they change their 
inductive theories in light of the arguments  sent by another  agent.  The belief 
revision process is embodied  in the  way the  set of undefeated  rules U(At ) 
changes from round to round, which also determines how an agent’s inductive 
theory  changes in light of the arguments  shared by the other agent. 
A  particular  implementation of this  integration   model  is the  A-MAIL 
framework [9], where two agents perform induction  on separate  example sets 
and engage in argumentation until  they  reach individual  inductive  theories 
that  are consistent with their example sets.  The A-MAIL framework offers a 
particular realization  of three  mechanisms of induction,  argumentation and 
belief revision.   The  need of having  an  argumentation-consistent inductive 
process is met by ABUI (Argumentation-based Bottom-Up  Induction), a new 
inductive  method  that  finds inductive  rules consistent with the set of unde- 
feated rules at any step of the argumentation process. 
 
7.1.  Exemplification 
Let us assume we have two agents, Ag1 and Ag2 and let ∆1 = {e1 , e2 , e3 } 
(containing  the three examples used in Section 3.3, an aardvark,  an antelope 
and a bass), and ∆2 = {e4 , e6 , e7 } (containing  some of the examples used in 
Section 6.1, a sealion, a platypus,  and a chicken).  Now, the two agents want
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to find a common inductive  theory  of the concept mammal,  represented  by 
the unary  predicate  m.  Let us explain the process. 
Before the protocol starts,  at t = 0, each agent has individually  found an 
inductive  theory: 
 
1  = {(∀x)(breathes(x) → m(x))}, and 
2  = {(∀x)(aquatic(x) → m(x))}. 
 
Intuitively,  since all the positive examples of mammal known to Ag1 are land 
animals,  and all the  negative  ones are not,  Ag1  has induced  that  breathing 
is enough to characterize  a mammal.  A similar situation  has occurred with 
Ag2, who has find by induction  that  being aquatic is enough to characterize 
a mammal,  since it  happens  that  the  only two examples of mammals  Ag2 
knows are aquatic. 
Moreover, at t = 0, each agent has communicated  to the other agent their 
individually  found inductive  theories  and  build  their  initial  argumentation 
systems, and thus: 
 
Θ0                   0                   0                  0
 
1→2  = T1 , and Θ2→1   = T2 ; 
0                                         0                                   0                                         0
 
A1  = (I R(∆1) ∪ Θ2→1,     ) and A2  = (I R(∆2) ∪ Θ1→2 ,    ). 
 
The protocol then  proceeds as follows. 
Round t = 1. 
1. Agents proceed by generating  attacks  against  the  rules they  have re- 
ceived they believe are defeated. 
 
•  Since  the  rule  (∀x)(aquatic(x)  →  m(x))   generated  by  Ag2   is 
defeated  according  to  Ag1, Ag1  selects  one attack  to  defeat  it: 
R1  = {(∀x)(aquatic(x) ∧ ¬hair(x) → ¬m(x))}; 
 
•  Since the  rule  (∀x)(breathes(x)  →  m(x))  generated  by  Ag1   is 
defeated  according  to  Ag2, Ag2  selects  one attack  to  defeat  it: 
R2  = {(∀x)(breathes(x) ∧ f eathers(x) → ¬m(x))}; 
 
2. These attacks  are sent to each other. 
3. Agents update  their theories:
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•  Due to the attacks  recieved, Ag1  updates  its inductive  theory  by 
removing all the defeated arguments,  and replacing them by new
undefeated  arguments,   and  generates:   T 1 = {(∀x)(hair(x)  →
m(x))}. 
•  Analogously,  Ag2  updates  its  inductive  theory  by  removing  all 
the  defeated  arguments,  and  replacing  them  by new undefeated 
arguments,  and generates:  T 1  = {(∀x)(milk(x) → m(x))}. 
 
4. These theories are sent to each other. 
5. Agents update  their states:
 
•  Θ1 
 
= Θ0 
 
∪ R ∪ T ; Θ 
 
= Θ0 
 
∪ R ∪ T ;1→2 
1
 
1→2 1          1         2→1 
1                        2
 
2→1            2          2 
1•  A1  = (IR(∆1) ∪ Θ2→1,     ), A1  = (IR(∆2) ∪ Θ1→2,     ) 
 
Round t = 2. 
 
1. Agents should try now to generate attacks,  but since the arguments sent 
in the previous round R1  and R1  are undefeated  in the argumentation 1                  2 
systems A1   and A1   respectively, no new attacks  can be generated  and 2                  1 
the protocol ends. 
 
As a result,  both  agents have reached inductive  theories T 1  and T 1  that 1                  2 
are consistent  with the  whole set of examples of both  agents  ∆1 ∪ ∆2  (i.e. 
each theory  has any counterexample  neither  in ∆1  nor in ∆2).  Theorem  2 
guarantees  that 
 
T ∗ = T 1 ∪ T 1  = {(∀x)(hair(x) → m(x)), (∀x)(milk(x) → m(x))} 1           2 
 
is a common and agreed argumentation-consistent inductive  theory.  Notice 
that  this result is reached without  exchanging any example, and exchanging 
a small amount of inducible rules. 
 
 
8.  Related Work 
 
Peter  Flach  [1] introduced  a logical analysis  of induction,  focusing on 
hypothesis  generation.    In  Flach’s  analysis,  induction  was studied  on the 
meta-level of consequence relations  and focused on different properties  that 
may be desirable for different kinds of induction.  In this paper we cover both 
hypothesis  generation  and  hypothesis  selection,  but  we focus in a limited 
form of induction,  namely inductive concept learning, extensively studied  in
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machine learning.  A direct difference between Flach’s work and the research 
presented in this paper is that  we impose strong syntactical  constraints on our 
inductive  consequence relation  (from sets of examples to rules),  in order to 
focus on the specific machine learning problem of inductive concept learning, 
whereas the  work of Peter  Flach,  no restrictions  were applied,  in order  to 
study  the  soundness  and  completeness  of sets  of meta-level  properties  of 
inductive  consequence relations.  Appendix B offers an in-depth  comparison 
of some properties  of our consequence relation  with  some of Flach’s meta- 
level properties. 
A refinement of Flach’s consistency-based  confirmation  using Hempel’s 
direct confirmation was studied  in [4]. The authors  proposed that  inductive 
generalization  can  be modeled  as  a  deductive  process  given a  completion 
technique,  which captures  inductive  assumptions,  such as “every  unknown 
individual  is similar  to  the  known ones.”   The  difference with  our work is 
that,  albeit restricted  to the particular task of ICL, we propose a specific non- 
monotonic  logic consequence relation,  instead  of resorting  to a completion 
technique. 
Related  to the work of Flach is that  of DelGrande  [3], where he studied 
the algebra of hypotheses that  can be formed by induction from sets of exam- 
ples.  In the same way as Flach,  DelGrande  limited  his study  to hypothesis 
generation,  and  considered  that  his model is a restriction  with  respect  to 
the general problem of induction,  where induction  as such plays the limited 
role of proposing  an  initial  set  of hypotheses,  which is later  refined using 
deductive  techniques. 
Also related is the work of Datteri  et al. [2], where induction  (in machine 
learning) was understood  as a deductive process; Dateri et al. modeled a typ- 
ical process of a machine learning inductive  algorithm  in several steps,  and 
provided a logical model for each step (that they call “deductive”). The final 
argument was that  machine learning  inductive  algorithms  are then  “induc- 
tionless,” as every step in the process is a logical inference. Our approach,  a 
non-monotonic logical model of the whole process of an inductive algorithm, 
clarifies the nature  of inductive  concept  learning:  it is a form of defeasible 
(i.e.  non-deductive) reasoning,  similar (albeit  not  identical)  to other  forms 
of defeasible reasoning modeled by non-monotonic  logic. 
Concerning the integration  of inductive reasoning with other forms of log- 
ical reasoning, Michalski [23], in his Inferential Theory of Learning, started a 
unified characterization of all forms of inference (deduction,  analogy, induc- 
tion,  etc.)  and defined knowledge transmutation operators.   However, those
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operators  were only illustrated with examples, and never completely formal- 
ized.  In this  paper,  we have taken  on a smaller task:  instead  of trying  to 
formalize all types of inference, we have focused on a very specific form of 
inference (inductive  generalization),  and,  in this  way, we have managed  to 
completely characterize  it in the form of a consequence relation. 
Our approach to model multiagent induction is related to that  of merging 
argumentation systems, which has been studied by Coste-Marquis  et al. [24], 
where a group of agents,  each one having a different argumentation  frame- 
work (with  potentially  inconsistent attack  relations)  want to merge them. 
Coste-Marquis  et al.  proposed  to  do so by sharing  all the  arguments  and 
then  letting  each agent construct  a partial  argumentation system where one 
argument attacks  another  when the  majority  of agents  in the  group  that 
know both  arguments  consider  there  is an  attack.    After  that,   agents  can 
merge their  opinions  on which  arguments  are  defeated.    Notice,  however, 
that  in our setting,  since we are not dealing with an abstract argumentation 
framework and our arguments  are actually  logical formulas, all agents agree 
on the attack  relation,  and thus,  we don’t require such merging procedure. 
Arguments  and  argumentation have  been  used  in a few approaches  of 
machine learning.  For instance,  arguments  are used in the argument-based 
machine learning framework [25]; this approach  did not employ an argumen- 
tation  process, instead  it assumed  that  arguments  are given as part  of the 
input of the inductive process, and are exploited by the inductive algorithm. 
Argumentation has  been used in the  context  of multiagent learning  in 
[26]; however,  this  approach  used argumentation and  machine  learning  as 
black-boxes  that   are  not  integrated,  while our  logical model  of inductive 
generalization  allows for a deep integration of inductive reasoning and argu- 
mentation.  Amgoud and  Serrurier  [27] proposed  the  use of argumentation 
as a framework to formalize the classification process, and in particular bi- 
nary  classification in the  context  of concept  learning.   The  main difference 
between the  work of Amgoud and Serrurier  and ours is that  they  focus on 
classification, i.e. given an unclassified example, a set of examples and a set 
of hypotheses,  find the  classification of the  new instance together  with  an 
explanation  of why such classification is provided.  Argumentation, in their 
framework,  is used to determine  which possible classifications (understood 
as arguments  coming from examples or hypotheses)  are acceptable,  given all 
the  other  hypotheses  and examples,  and thus  determine  a classification for 
the  new example.  They  also considered a preference relation  on the  set of 
hypothesis  for guiding the search in the hypothesis  space and to define the
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attack  relation between them.  In contrast, in our work, we are interested  on 
a logical modeling of the concept learning process itself: the process through 
which hypotheses  (rules)  are generated  from a given set of examples.   We 
also use a preference relation,  but  we used it to rank the induced rules and 
the set of inductive theories, rather  than  to define the attack  relation.  In our 
proposal,  argumentation is only used as a communication  framework when 
multiple agents are involved in the learning process. 
Our  previous  work  focused first  on  case-based  learning  from 
argumentation-based communication  processes [28], where arguments  in the 
form of both rules and cases were interchanged, but no inductive theory was 
reached:   the  agents  used  case-based  learning  plus  argumentation to  clas- 
sify unknown examples.  Later,  as mentioned  before, the A-MAIL framework 
was the first realization  of an argumentation-based approach  to multiagent 
induction  [9].  The  main  difference between  [9] and  the  work presented  in 
this  paper  is that   A-MAIL  was a  particular implementation that  was ex- 
perimentally  validated  to work, in the sense that  agents  achieved mutually 
consistent inductive  definitions of a concept  by exchanging  arguments  and 
attacks3. However, there was no formal proof, in [9], that  achieving mutually 
consistent inductive  definitions was always possible, as we have done in this 
paper.   On the  other  hand,  in this  paper  we focus on providing  theoretical 
results  that  explain why an approach  like A-MAIL may achieve coordinated 
induction  using argumentation. 
 
 
9.  Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This paper presents two main contributions, one being an inductive con- 
sequence relation in the framework of non-monotonic reasoning for inductive 
concept learning, and the other argumentation-consistent induction, integrat- 
ing learning  from examples by inductive  generalization  with  learning  from 
argumentation-based communication. 
The  standard model of non-monotonic  reasoning  could not  be directly 
applied to our inductive  consequence relation.  We needed to relax and rein- 
 
 
3 Specifically, in [9] we focused on developing and evaluating an inductive  algorithm that 
take  into account argument attacks; this algorithm, called ABUI for argumentation-based 
bottom-up induction, performs a bottom up search in the space of generalizations to find 
an induced  rule from examples  such that is not  defeated  by the  set of known arguments 
attacking previously  induced  rules.
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terpret some of the  properties  of this  model, taking  into  account that  our 
inductive consequence relation is defined between two different sets of formu- 
las (examples and rules).  Specifically, Cautious  Monotonicity  and Cautious 
Right Weakening properties  maintain  the spirit of the standard model prop- 
erties by reinterpreting them  into a context  in which we have two separate 
sets of formulae. 
Furthermore, Proposition  2 presented six additional  properties that  char- 
acterize our inductive consequence relation which, as we have shown, are the 
properties  specific to, and anticipated for, inductive  concept learning. 
The  notion  of inductive  theory,  introduced  here,  is a  formalization  of 
the intuitive  notion of the output resulting  from an ICL algorithm:  a set of 
formulas that, as a whole, cover and explain all positive examples of the target 
concept.  This notion allows us to deal with hypothesis selection modeled as 
preferences over inductive theories, modeling well established inductive biases 
such as parsimony  and error margin maximization. 
Moreover, the  notion  of inductive  theory  has allowed us, in the  second 
part of this paper, to integrate  the non-monotonic reasoning process of induc- 
tive  generalization  with  another  non-monotonic  reasoning  process, namely 
argumentation. Argumentation-consistent induction  is the key notion in ar- 
ticulating  inductive generalization  with argumentation: the rules derived by 
induction  are required to be acceptable inside the argumentation framework. 
Conceptually,   the  rules induced  by an  agent are  learnt not  only from ex- 
amples but  from the  arguments  that  are the  result  of communicating  with 
another  agent. 
Finally,  argumentation-consistent induction  allowed us to  prove that  a 
group of agents communicating  their induced rules and performing argumen- 
tation  would obtain  the  exact  same set of inducible  rules as a single agent 
knowing the examples known to all agents.  Thus,  learning directly from ex- 
amples is equivalent (modulo inductive theory equivalence) to learning from 
communication  from another  agent that  also learns from examples.  In other 
words, for two  agents  or more, first communicating  all their  examples and 
then  learning  by induction  is equivalent to first learning  by induction  indi- 
vidually and then communicating  the generalizations  they have learnt using 
argumentation. 
In this paper we have centered our analysis on a setting where we assume 
no noise in the examples, and where we do not allow induced rules to have 
any counterexamples.  ICL techniques usually accept generalizations that  are 
not 100% consistent with the set of examples.  Our future work will focus on
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moving from a purely Boolean approach  to a graded (or weighted) approach, 
where generalizations  that  are not  100% consistent with  the  examples can 
have a degree of acceptability.  This broader  framework would be closer to 
implemented  systems such as A-MAIL [9] that  accept induced rules with less 
than 100% consistency as long as they are above a given confidence threshold. 
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Appendix A.  Argumentation-consistent Induction for  n Agents 
 
The main theoretical result of this paper concerning inductive  concept learning 
in multiagent systems  is captured in Theorem  1.  Such result  states  that learning 
directly from examples is equivalent to learning from communication from another 
agent that also learns  from examples.  In this  appendix,  we generalize this  result 
for multiagent systems with more than  two agents. 
 
 
Theorem 3.  (Argumentation-consistent  Induction for  n Agents) 
U(
S
i=1...n IR(∆i )) = IR(
S
i=1...n ∆i ). 
 
Proof.   Notice  that by  definition  U(IR(∆)) =  IR(∆); consequently,   we  have 
AIR(∆, IR(∆)) = IR(∆). 
First,  we prove that IR(
S
i=1...n ∆i ) ⊆ U(
S
i=1...n IR(∆i )).  Let r = α → C be 
such that r ∈ IR(
S
i=1...n ∆i ), then  r covers a positive  example of 
S
i=1...n ∆i  and 
does not  cover any negative  example of 
S
i=1...n ∆i .  W.l.o.g.,  assume the  covered 
positive  example  is from  ∆k .   Then  r ∈ IR(∆k ).   Suppose  there  exists  a  rule 
r0  = β → ¬C ∈ 
S
i=1...n IR(∆i ) such that r
0   r, i.e.  such that K ` β → α.  It is 
clear that r0  6∈ IR(∆k ), hence assume  r0  ∈ IR(∆j ) for some ∆j , such that j = 
k. 
This means r0  covers a negative  example δ− ∈ ∆j , but  if r0  covers it, r must  cover 
δ−  as well, contradiction. 
Second, we prove that IR(
S
i=1...n ∆i ) ⊇ U(
S
i=1...n IR(∆i )).  Let r = α → C 
be such that r ∈ U(
S
i=1...n IR(∆i )).  W.l.o.g.,  assume r ∈ IR(∆k ).  Then  r covers 
a positive example of ∆k and does not cover any negative example of ∆k . Assume 
also, looking for a contradiction, that r 6∈ IR(
S
i=1...n ∆i ).  Since we have assumed 
that r ∈ IR(∆k ), this  means that r covers a negative  example  of some ∆j .  This 
negative  example  can be specialized  to a rule r0  = β → ¬C ∈ IR(∆j ) such that 
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K  ` β → α.  Since r0  is the  specialization  of an example  in ∆j and  
S
i=1...n ∆i is
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consistent, the rule r0  is undefeated. Consequently, r 6∈ U(
S
i=1...n IR(∆i )), 
which contradicts our original assumption. Therefore  we can conclude IR(
S
i=1...n 
∆i ) ⊇ U(
S
i=1...n IR(∆i )). 
 
 
Appendix B.  Flach’s general approach to  inductive consequence 
relations 
 
In their seminal paper [7] Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM) study “general 
patterns of non-monotonic reasoning  and try  to isolate properties  that could help 
us map the field of non-monotonic reasoning  by reference to positive properties”. 
Following Gabbay  [14], KLM focus their  study  at  the  level of consequence  rela- 
tions and choose a Gentzen-style notation of axiom schemata  and inference rules 
to  express  structural properties  of a consequence  relation  that could adequately 
represent a non-monotonic logic. 
Based  on the  KLM framework,  Flach  [1, 5] studies  the  process  of inductive 
hypothesis  formation  from  two perspectives:   finding  general  rules  that explain 
given specific evidence (explanatory  induction ), and finding general rules that are 
confirmed  by  the  evidence  (confirmatory induction ).   Both  forms  of hypothesis 
formation  are axiomatised  also at  the  level of consequence  relations,  providing  a 
set of rationality postulates for various forms of induction. 
For  Flach,  an inductive  consequence  relation  |∼ is a set of pairs  of formulae, 
α  |∼  β  meaning  that “β  is a  possible  inductive  hypothesis  given  evidence  α”. 
Inductive  consequence relations  are intended  to model the behaviour  of inductive 
agents.    Flach  does  not  fix a  particular definition  of |∼,  he  studies  rationality 
postulates limiting  different possible definitions.   He starts with  a set  of general 
principles  for induction  and then  presents  specific sets of principles  for each type 
of induction  (explanatory and confirmatory). 
Since our  consequence  relation  |∼K    is defined  between  two  different  sets  of 
formulas  (examples  and  rules),  most  of these  properties  do not  directly  apply  to 
our  setting.   Nevertheless,  it  is interesting to  check whether  the  Flach’s  general 
principles (listed  below) underlying  these properties  hold for |∼K   . 
 
1.  Verification  (a predicted  observation verifies the hypothesis) 
 
` α ∧ β → γ, α |∼ β α ∧ 
γ |∼ β 
 
2.  Falsification  (an  observation, the  negation  of which was predicted, falsifies 
the hypothesis) 
` α ∧ β → γ, α |∼ β 
α ∧ ¬γ |∼ β
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3.  Left Logical Equivalence  (the  logical form of the evidence is immaterial) 
` α ↔ β, α |∼ γ β 
|∼ γ 
 
4.  Right Logical Equivalence  (the  logical form of the hypothesis  is immaterial) 
` β ↔ γ, α |∼ β α 
|∼ γ 
 
5.  Left Reflexivity (evidence allowing some hypothesis  is admissible) 
α |∼ β 
α |∼ α 
 
6.  Right Reflexivity (any  hypothesis  allowed by some evidence is admissible) 
α |∼ β 
β |∼ β 
 
7.  Right Extension  (any  hypothesis  can be extended  with a prediction) 
` α ∧ β → γ, α |∼ β α 
|∼ β ∧ γ 
In order to check the validity  of these general principles in our ICL framework, 
we need first to set out how to interpret Flach’s consequence relation  |∼ in terms of 
our inductive  consequence relation |∼K , taking into account our restricted language 
of rules and  examples.  Indeed,  in an expression α |∼ β we interpret the  evidence 
α  as a set of (both  positive  and  negative)  examples  ∆ for a concept  C , and  the 
hypothesis  β as a rule (∀x)(ϕ(x) → C (x)). 
In this setting,  we provide the following justifications and propose an adapted 
form of these principles to our framework: 
 
1.  Verification:  interpreting a predicted  observation as a new positive example 
γ(a) ∧C (a) already covered by an induced rule β → C from a set of examples 
∆, the principle holds by property 3 of Proposition 2 (Positive monotonicity). 
  K `  γ → β, ∆ |∼K β → C   
∆ ∪ {γ(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K   β → C 
2.  Falsification:   with  the  same interpretation as in the  previous  item,  a new 
negative  example  γ(a)  ∧ ¬C (a)  is not  covered  by an  induced  rule  β  → C 
from ∆ when γ(a) ∧ C (a)  was already  covered by β → C . That is, 
   K `  γ → β, ∆ |∼K β → C   
∆ ∪ {γ(a) ∧ ¬C (a)} |∼K   β → C 
This follows by the very definition of the inductive  consequence relation  |∼K .
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3.  Left Logical Equivalence:  if ∆ |∼K   α → C and ∆ ≡K   ∆0, then  ∆0  |∼K   α → 
C . This directly  follows from property 2 in Proposition 1. 
 
∆ |∼K α → C, ∆ ≡K ∆0 
∆0  |∼K   α → C 
 
4.  Right Logical Equivalence:   if K  ` β ↔ α and  ∆ |∼K   α → C , then  ∆ |∼K 
β → C . This directly  follows from property 3 in Proposition 1. 
 
K ` β ↔ α, ∆ |∼K α → C 
∆ |∼K   β → C 
 
5.  Left Reflexivity:  if ∆ |∼K   β → C for some rule β → C , this means that ∆ is 
consistent, and hence, for every α(a) ∧ C (a) ∈ ∆, we have {α(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K 
α → C . This follows from property 1 of Proposition 1. 
 
∆ |∼K β → C, α(a)  ∧ C (a)  ∈ ∆ 
{α(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K   α → C 
 
6.  Right Reflexivity:  if ∆ |∼K   β → C  for some set of examples  ∆, for every 
example β(a) ∧ C (a),  we have {β(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K   β → C . This follows from 
property 1 of Proposition 1. 
 
          ∆ |∼K β → C   
{β(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K   β → C 
 
7.  Right  Extension:   if ∆ |∼K    β  →  C , by  definition  of covering,  there  must 
exist  a positive  example  α(a)  ∧ C (a)  ∈ ∆ such that ` α  → β.  Assuming 
` α ∧ β → γ, we have that ` α → β ∧ γ.  Since ∆ is assumed to be consistent, 
β ∧γ cannot cover any negative example, and consequently ∆ |∼K   β ∧γ → C . 
 
∆ |∼K β → C, {α(a) ∧ C (a)} |∼K β → C,  ` α ∧ β → γ 
∆ |∼K   β ∧ γ → C 
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